2019-马醒初：意识“整体信息理论”的科学及哲学合理性探疑

题目：意识“整体信息理论”的科学及哲学合理性探疑

答辩人：马醒初

指导教师：刘晓力教授

答辩时间： 2019.11.25

导论意识的哲学与科学研究

0.1 笛卡尔的心-物实体二元论及其启发

0.2 意识的哲学问题和科学问题

0.3 意识与物理主义

0.4 取消主义与功能主义的困难

0.5 意识及其概念结构

第一章意识的早期哲学和科学理论

1.1 心智的计算主义和联结主义理论

1.2 意识的表征主义理论

1.3 意识的神经相关物(NCC)进路

1.4 全局工作空间理论及其衍生理论模型

1.5 意识的动力系统理论

第二章IIT理论三个版本的沿革

2.1 神经系统的复杂性及其度量

2.2 IIT理论的基本思想

2.3 IIT-1.0——意识复杂度的刻画

2.4 IIT-2.0——感受质的几何化

2.5 IIT-3.0——公理化的意识理论

第三章 IIT理论的优势

3.1 IIT理论的哲学立场

3.2 IIT理论对“信息”的理解和重构

3.3 IIT理论对埃德尔曼早期工作的发展

3.4 IIT理论能够解释和预测的经验事实

3.5 IIT理论与全局工作空间理论的对比

第四章IIT理论在哲学上的合理性问题

4.1 一种同一(identity)理论何以可能

4.2 因果性与还原论

4.3 概念与知觉概念

4.4 对IIT理论的批评及回应

4.5 IIT理论能否解释意识的难问题

第五章 IIT理论在科学上的合理性问题

5.1 意识的科学研究进路

5.2 IIT-3.0版本与早期版本的区别

5.3 IIT理论的反直觉反例和相关争论

5.4 神经可塑性对IIT理论的可能启示

5.5 “匹配”——IIT理论对意识适应性的解释

总结

参考文献

致谢

摘要

本文主要在已有的各种关于意识的哲学及科学研究的背景下，对近二十年来由G. 托诺尼及其合作者提出的意识的整体信息理论(Integrated Information Theory)(IIT) 的主要哲学问题和科学问题做了探讨，这一理论将意识视为一种整体的，不可分割的信息，这种“信息”不同于早期的“香农信息”，它的产生出于某个物理系统——作为一个整体, 而非其各个部分的组合——的因果性造成的对该系统过去和未来状态的的确定性和区分性，即G. 贝特森(G.Bateson) 所述的作为“造成差异的差异”的“信息”的理念在一个物理系统“内部视角”下的具体体现。IIT 理论的3.0 版本已不再像早期版本那样依赖于香农信息论，而是从反思意识的现象方面的基本特征以及因果性的本质出发，为意识建立了一个哲学-数学公理化模型，并提出了意识经验等同于“最大不可还原概念结构”这一同一性原理，具有了初步的解释和预测能力。

在导论中，本文在论证了各种有关意识的哲学立场的理论困难的基础上，阐述了意识的研究需要在埃德尔曼的物理主义立场下进行的原因，并分析了心灵哲学中取消主义和各种功能主义的困难，随后引入了阿斯克里提出的对于心-身问题的一种解决方案，即意识与大脑的关系问题可以严格地定义为某种在数学上可以解决的问题，即意识中的概念结构或者语义图为我们提供了一种度量意识的方式，要解决意识与大脑之间的关系的难题，只需要表明意识中的概念结构或语义图在数学上与大脑神经系统连接形成的空间-时间模式具有一定的等价性，这也是托诺尼提出IIT 理论的重要思想来源之一。

本文的第一章陈述了意识的早期哲学和科学理论，包括心灵哲学和人工智能哲学的中的计算主义和联结主义、各种表征主义对意识的解释以及相关的哲学分析和批评，在关于意识的科学探讨中，这一章说明了“意识的神经相关物”——NCC 进路，巴斯提出的全局工作空间理论和各种动力系统理论中的解释方案及其存在的不足。

第二章分析了IIT 理论产生的早期背景——对神经系统的“相对复杂性”的度量，随后梳理了IIT 理论已有的三个版本的基本思想及其演变过程，并详述了IIT 理论三个版本为意识所做的理论刻画。在本文第三章中，主要对IIT 理论关于意识的哲学立场，以及IIT 理论对“信息”概念的理解和重构做了阐述，并将其哲学立场界定为一种特殊的“非还原物理主义”。随后论述了IIT 理论对于埃德尔曼早期工作——“神经集群选择理论”的发展以及IIT 理论相比全局工作空间理论而言的差异和优势，并说明了IIT 理论能够解释的经验科学事实。

本文的最后两章——第四、五章着重探讨了IIT 理论目前仍然存在的哲学和科学上的合理性问题。其中第四章的内容涉及到“IIT 理论的‘同一性原理’作为一种“桥接律”是否成立？整体的、不可分或不可还原的因果性所在的时空精细度该如何确定？”等问题，并且从源自汉森的哲学思考中提出了“知觉概念”，以此为IIT 理论的哲学合理性做了辩护，随后陈述了哲学界对于IIT 理论的一些批评和相关回应，进而论证了IIT 理论为何没有能够解释意识的难问题。

第五章则首先对IIT 研究意识的科学研究进路做了定位，即塞尔所述的“统一场进路”，那么沿着这一进路，IIT 理论(3.0 版本) 则需要解释某个物理系统从其整体的因果性中确定或区分的“最大不可还原概念结构”是否能够产生语义的问题。后续的一些科学问题还包括从IIT 理论推出的一些反直觉“反例”的争论，以及从大脑作为一个“可塑的神经系统”的有关研究，尤其是对于“正念禅修”的相关研究得到的意识本身对于其物理基础的改变作用是否能够通过IIT 理论加以解释的问题，本章中也指出了IIT 理论为意识适应环境的能力所做的解释中存在的逻辑疏漏。

Abstract

This article, under the background of the philosophy and scientific investigations about consciousness all we already have，discussed the main philosophy and scientific problem of the Integrated Information Theory——IIT，which has raised by G. Tononi and his cooperators since the recent 20 years. IIT considered consciousness as an integrated，impartible information, what is different from anterior Shannon Information，generated from the definiteness or differentiation of the causality within a physical system —— as a whole，not as a combination of its parts —— acting on the past and future states of the system，a definite form of information，as Batson says the difference that make a difference considered the causality within a physical system. Currently，IIT 3.0，not depends on Shannon information theory as the anterior version any more，through some philosophy reflection about the basic characteristics in the phenomenon aspects of consciousness and the nature of causality，with a preliminary interpretation and prediction capabilities，both constructed a philosophy-mathematical model of consciousness and raised the identity principle that consciousness experience is identical to a maximally irreducible conceptual structure.

This article，in the introduction chapter，based on the argument of the theoretical difficulties in some of the philosophy standpoints about consciousness，I stated the reason why we should adopt Edelman’s physicalism in the investigation of consciousness，then，after the analysis of the theoretical difficulties in eliminatism and functionalism in the philosophy of mind，I introduced Ascoli’s solution to the mind-body problem，in which the relationship of conscious and brain can be strictly defined as a problem in the form that we can solve within mathematics，it means that the concept structure or semantic graph in our conscious supplies us a way to measure itself，to solve the very hard problem in consciousness and brain，only the equivalence of some kind between the concept structural or semantic graphs in the consciousness and the space-time model formed from the connection in the neural system within a brain should be explained mathematically，which is also an important source of ideas for IIT theory raised by Tononi.

In the first chapter，I state some of the early philosophy and scientific theories about consciousness，including computerism，connectionism and some kinds of representationalism in the philosophy of A.I. and philosophy of mind，as well as some analyses and critiques about them. In the scientific approach of consciousness，this chapter，illustrated the explanation and deficiencies raised by the approach of neural correlates of consciousness——NCC and the global workspace theory raised by Baars，as well as the dynamic system theory.

In the second chapter，I analyzed the early background on which IIT theory generated——the measures to the relative complexity in a neural system，then I reorganized the evolution and basic ideas in the current，three version of IIT，and stated the theoretical characterization for the consciousness in current，three version of IIT.

It is，mainly，in the third chapter，about the philosophy standpoint and the concept of information understanding and reconstructed by IIT，and，I demarcate the standpoint of IIT as an special form of “irreductive physicalism”. Then I stated，both the development，comparing with Edelman’s early work，named the theory of neuronal group selection，of IIT，and，the differences and advantages compared with the global workspace theory，then I illustrated the relative empirical facts can be explained by IIT.

In the last two chapter，the forth and the fifth chapter，of this article，it mainly discussed some rationality problems in the philosophy and scientific aspects that IIT still have. In the content of the forth chapter，it involves the problems as “whether the identical principle in IIT as a bridge principle could be confirmed? How to determine the space-time grain in which the integrated, indivisible or irreductive causation exist ? ” ，and，I argued the existence of "perceptual conception" from Hanson’s philosophy ideas and then defend the rationality of IIT on that，then，I stated some critiques against IIT and some responds to these critiques，and argued why IIT cannot solve "the hard problem" of consciousness. In the fifth chapter，in the first place I demarcate the research approach of IIT as the unified-field approach raised by J. Searle，within the very approach，IIT，in its 3.0 version，should explain why the semantic aspects can emerge from the "maximally irreducible concept structure" specified or discriminated by the integrated causation in a physical system. Some following scientific problems，include the debates of some counterintuitive “counter-examples” which can be deducted from IIT，and the research that the brain could be seen as a "plastic neural system"，especially the fact，from the relative research of "mindfulness meditation"，that consciousness could affect the physical substrates beneath，could be explained by IIT，and then，I put forward some logic deficiency in the explanation for the fitting ability between consciousness and environment raised by IIT.