2019-孙慧中：苏珊·赫利的知觉-行动理论

题目：苏珊·赫利的知觉-行动理论

答辩人：孙慧中

指导老师：刘晓力教授

答辩时间：2019年11月25日

导论

0.1 认知主义与行动主义

0.2 一种不容忽视的知觉-行动理论

0.3 论文结构

第1章赫利对认知主义知觉观的诊断

1.1 知觉的认知主义和心灵的计算表征理论

1.2 福多模块与关于知觉和行动的“输入-输出”图景

1.3 “输入-输出”图景与视觉的双通道假说

1.4 知觉的认知主义理论面临的困难

1.5 认知主义知觉观的“三明治”模型及其研究误区

本章小结

第2章 “共享回路”模型及其应用

2.1 “共享回路”模型

2.2 社会认知中的模仿、熟虑和读心

2.3 “共享回路”模型怎样解释模仿、熟虑和读心

2.4 “共享回路”模型中的层间关系

2.5 “共享回路”模型的神经实现

本章小结

第3章赫利的知觉行动理论与知觉的行动主义

3.1 对生态学视觉理论的继承和修正

3.2 感受质的感觉运动解释

3.3 感觉运动可能性和感觉运动知识

3.4 感觉运动知识是否构成知觉经验

3.5 赫利的知觉-行动理论对行动主义的影响

本章小结

第4章高级认知与感觉运动过程的紧密关联

4.1 高级认知与感觉运动过程

4.2 眼动与认知

4.3 载体外在主义的合理性

4.4 赫利的知觉-行动观点对延展认知的影响

4.5 高级认知过程依赖于感觉运动过程

本章小结

第5章 “共享回路”模型与预测大脑

5.1 预测加工和预测大脑

5.2 双眼竞争的神经科学研究

5.3 以行动为导向的分层预测加工模型

5.4 “共享回路”模型和分层预测加工模型

5.5 预测大脑与心灵边界

本章小结

结论与展望

参考文献

摘要

哲学家苏珊·赫利所提出的”共享回路”模型代表了一种不同于认知主义传统的全新的知觉观和心灵观。她关于知觉和行动的思想对于解决认知主义传统研究范式的困境提供了新的思路，也对行动主义研究进路的成熟和发展具有重要贡献。

本文结合大量认知神经科学的经验证据，着重分析赫利的知觉-行动思想以及她的”共享回路”模型在行动主义研究进路中承前启后的重要作用。并且，作者认为赫利的知觉-行动理论在今天的认知科学和哲学讨论中仍有重要价值。赫利的思想从更高的层次上超出了行动主义和认知主义关于知觉与行动的争论，她的思想还渗透在关于载体外在主义、延展认知、预测大脑等议题的讨论中，对当下的热门话题具有启示价值。

在 20 世纪 60 年代到 70 年代，知觉的认知主义理论在认知科学和哲学的讨论中占据主导地位。知觉的认知主义传统认为知觉也是认知过程，认知的本质是心理符号的表征和计算。赫利用讥讽的方式指出，认知主义传统下的主流科学研究和哲学探讨默认一种关于知觉、认知和行动的过于简单化的―三明治‖ 模型。按照这种―三明治‖模型，认知是心灵的核心，认知的本质是计算，思想具有类语言的结构，并且可以用心理表征来刻画，而知觉与行动是相互独立的系统，分别对应于感觉输入和运动输出。赫利认为这种过于简化的―三明治‖式模型造成一些严重的研究误区。赫利认为计算表征主义不恰当地假定在思想内容和心理表征之间存在同形同构的对应关系，而这种错误预设又导致其他两个研究误区，即关于意识的时间原子论以及关于意识的统一场所假设。

在对以上问题进行诊断的基础上，赫利提出了一种新的看待知觉、认知和行动的模型，也就是”共享回路”模型。”共享回路”模型清晰地区分了人的层次和亚人层次这两个不同的解释层次，并在两个层次上将知觉与行动构成性地关联在一起。根据―共享回路‖理论，人的层次上的知觉、行动以及高级认知活动共享亚人层次的基础，这个基础就是由感觉输入和运动输出构成的动态循环圈。赫利结合一些社会认知方面的研究，展示了模仿、熟虑、读心等认知活动如何通过在运动输出与感觉输入之间的动态反馈系统得到解释。赫利认为高级认知能力可以从积极主动的知觉中突现，无需内在计算或加工。―共享回路‖模型也得到一些认知科学研究的印证和实现。

赫利的思想对行动主义研究进路的发展具有关键作用。行动主义理论主张知觉即行动，它认为知觉依赖于人和动物在与环境得交互中主动进行的头、眼以及身体运动。这是一种基于行动的生成知觉理论，在本文中将它称作行动主义研究进路，特指生成认知的其中一个版本。行动主义由吉普森的生态学视觉理论发展而来，其主要代表是苏珊·赫利关于知觉和行动的理论以及感觉运动可能性理论。赫利的知觉-行动思想对于行动主义研究进路的发展具有承前启后的关键作用。一方面，赫利的―共享回路‖理论继承了吉普森视觉理论在人和亚人两个解释层次上开展的做法，同时修正了吉普森关于感觉输入和运动输出关系的理解，以不同于认知主义的方式保留了吉普森完全摒弃的认知过程。另一方面，赫利同诺伊一起提出对―感受质‖的感觉运动解释，为认知主义传统下这一―难问题‖提供新的思路。

本文认为，赫利的知觉-行动观点和她的”共享回路”模型的独特之处在于，这种观点以不同于认知主义的方式建立一种包含高级认知、知觉和行动在内的统一解释框架，以一种彻底跳出―三明治‖模型传统的方式，刻画高级认知与感觉运动过程之间更紧密的关联。这种密切关联还得到关于眼动的相关经验证据的支持。最后，在”共享回路”模型中起关键作用的模拟、预测、反事实离线模拟等亚人过程也可以在近年来兴起的以行动为导向的预测加工和预测大脑等观点中找到可应用前景。

关键词:“共享回路”模型苏珊•赫利知觉行动

Abstract

Susan Hurley proposed the”shared circuits” model, which integrates the advanced cognitive processes, perception and action into a unified interpretation framework, and represents a brand new view of perception and mind that is different from the tradition of cognitivism. Her thoughts provide new ideas to solve the dilemma of traditional cognitive research paradigm and make important contributions to the maturity and development of the enactivism approach.

Based on a large amount of empirical evidence, this paperfocuses on the role of Hurley's theory of perception and action and her “shared circuits” model in connecting the past and the future in the study of enactivism. Moreover, I hold that Hurley's perception-action theory is still of great value in today's cognitive science and philosophical discussions. From a higher level, Hurley's thoughts go beyond the debate on perception and action between enactivism and cognitivism. Her thoughts are also permeated in the discussions on currently hot topics such as vehicle externalism,extended cognition, and predictive brain.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the cognitivist theory of perception dominated the discussion in cognitive science and philosophy. According to the cognitivism tradition of perception, perception is cognitive, and the essence of cognition is the representation and calculation of psychological symbols. Hurley points out ironically that the mainstream view in past scientific research and philosophical inquiry implies an oversimplified “sandwich model” of perception, cognition and action. According to this “sandwich model” , cognition is essentially computation, and also the core of mind. Thoughts have language-like structures and can be characterized by mental representations, while perception and action are independent systems corresponding to sensory input and motor output respectively. Hurley argues that this oversimplified”sandwich model” leads to some serious mistakes. According to Hurley, computational representationalism inappropriately assumes that there is an isomorphic correspondence between thought content and mental representation. This

wrong assumption leads to two other misunderstandings, namely, the temporal atomism of consciousness and the assumption of a unified locus of consciousness.

Hurley suggests a new model for understanding perception, cognition and action, known as the “shared circuits” model. This model clearly distinguishes two different levels of interpretation, namely, personal and subpersonal level, and it constructively correlates perception and action at both level. Perception, action and advanced cognitive activities at personal level share subpersonal resources, namely, the dynamic circuits between sensory inputs and motor outputs.In combination with some empirical researches on social cognition, Hurley articulates how cognitive activities such as imitation, deliberation, and mind-reading can be explained by a dynamic feedback system between motor outputs and sensory inputs. Hurley believes that advanced cognitive skills can emerge from active perception without any internal computation or processing. The “shared circuits” model has also been implemented by some cognitive science studies.

Hurley's thoughts about perception and action play a key role in the development of the enactive approach to the study of perception. Enactivism advocates that perception is action, and it believes that perception depends on the active movements of head, eyes and body inn humans and animals‘ interaction with the environment. This is an action-based enactive theory of perception. I call it enactivism in this paper, which specifically refers to one of the versions of enactive cognition. Enactivism derived from Gibson's ecological vision theory. It mainly includes Susan Hurley's theory of perception and action, and the sensorimotor contingency theory. Hurley's perception-action view plays an important role in the development of the enactivism approach. On the one hand, Hurley's “shared circuits” model inherits Gibson's two level of interpretation, meanwhile modifies Gibson's understanding of the relation between sensory inputs and motor outputs, and it preserves the cognition which are completely abandoned by Gibson in a way different from cognitivism. On the other hand, Hurley and Noe proposed the sensorimotor account of qualia, which provides new ideas for this famous ―difficult problem‖ under the tradition of cognitivism.

Hurley's theory of perception and action, and the “shared circuit model” uniquely portrays tight dependence between advanced cognitive processes and the sub personal sensorimotor processes in a non-cognitive way. This model suggests a unified framework for understanding advanced cognitive processes, perception and action, which is totally different from the traditional cognitivist “sandwich model”. Hurley’s view is also supported by relevant empirical evidence about eye movement.Finally, subpersonal processes such as simulation, prediction and offline counterfactual simulation, which play key roles in the "shared circuits model”, can also found in the recently popular action-oriented prediction processing and the prediction brain. It shows the applicable prospect of this model.

Keywords: the “shared circuits model”; Susan Hurley; Perception; Action