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2014-冯艳霞:对隐喻本质的认知科学哲学研究
  作者:冯艳霞    文章来源:作者惠寄    点击数:    更新时间:2014-6-14    
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题名:对隐喻本质的认知科学哲学研究 

作者: 冯艳霞

指导老师:刘 晓 力 

答辩时间:2014520

 

 

 

George Lakoff Mark JohnsonL&    J)在挑战西方传统客观语义理论的基础上,向我们阐明了这样一种新的哲学假设:我们关联世界、理解世界的方式是隐喻式的,语言学意义上的隐喻研究只涉及对我们心智中更深层的跨领域连接的一种表面现象的讨论。他们认为:绝大部分的抽象概念或者那些不能通过经验划定的概念,通常是依赖于隐喻获取其意义的;而那些不能通过隐喻进行说明的概念是通过突现而来的。L&J主张,隐喻是与我们的经验对应产生的一种现象,拒绝以任何“相似性立场”说明隐喻的本质。L&J为代表的认知科学哲学家上述假设正在挑战着西方传统的真理观,也挑战着我们对意识本质的说明。

    我认为,LakoffJohnson等人并没有真正说明隐喻的本质。本文将论证LakoffJohnson理论的以下几个基本主张是不能为隐喻本质的说明提供支持的:

    1)认为大部分概念意义的获取是依赖于隐喻的,截断传统的概念与意义之间的连接;(2)否定任何相似性立场在隐喻本质解释中的作用;(3)隐喻所依赖的基础概念是突现而来的,并把这类基础概念定义为“突现概念”;(4)隐喻是借助于较为熟悉的概念来解释较不熟悉的概念的;(5)隐喻式认知所依赖的“涉身”概念是单向的。

    本文将分析客观语义理论背景下以及以LakoffJohnson为代表的认知科学哲学背景下对隐喻本质的说明。在对各种理论进行细致解析的基础上,主要对L&J的“涉身隐喻映射理论”进行修正。本文主张,在隐喻本质的探讨中,需要区分以下两组不同的相似性概念:同质相似性原理和异质抽象相似性原理;并提出以下核心论题:隐喻的使用是一种特殊的意义指示,是与我们的涉身体验紧密相关、以异质抽象相似性原理为基础的一种认知现象。

在涉身认知科学哲学的大背景下,本文对以L&J为代表的隐喻认知理论的修正主要有以下四点:第一,使用“知觉符号”概念来代替“突现概念”,以论证我们进行隐喻式思维所依赖的基础概念是与我们的经验对应产生、并且以同质相似性原理为基础的一类概念;第二,使用异质抽象相似性原理来说明隐喻的生成机制和生成过程;第三,对隐喻式认知所依赖的“涉身性”这一概念进行重新界定;第四,在Lakoff Johnson的“隐喻映射模型”、FauconnierTurner的“多空间概念整合模型”的基础上,提出了一个说明隐喻本质的“涉身性隐喻式认知模型”。本文还使用来自神经科学的“镜像神经元”的发现,来解释隐喻式认知交互是如何可能的;并使用Daniel Dennett的“意向性立场”来说明隐喻式认知的基本策略。

    在涉身认知哲学的大背景下,我将为以下核心假设作辩护:

    隐喻本质上是涉身的,是主要依赖于异质抽象相似性(Heterogeneous Abstract Similarity)原理产生的一种认知现象,是我们关联世界、理解世界的一种基本方式之一。

    为了对上述核心假设提供辩护的依据,本文分为以下五个论题展开论证:    [1] 论题之一(本体论论题):隐喻不仅仅是符号性的,还是概念性的。

    [2] 论题之二(隐喻的生成原理论题):涉身性隐喻是以异质抽象相似性原理为基础的一种认知现象。

    [3] 论题之三(基底论题):隐喻概念所依赖的基础是那些可直接观察的知觉符号,这些知觉符号是基于我们身体的直接感官体验产生的。

    [4] 论题之四(隐喻的生成过程论题):我们的常规概念系统大部分是通过隐喻式认知实现的。这一实现过程是涉身交互的,主体在已具备的知识背景的基础上,通过复杂的心理模拟(Mental Simulation)、想象think、情感与虚拟感知创造出一个新的感知空间进行新意义整合的过程。

    [5] 论题之五(隐喻性意义的非还原特征论题):涉身性隐喻的意义具有非还原特征,即使通过“转述”,也不能完全还原至其字面意义。

   

关键词:隐喻;认知;异质抽象相似性原理;涉身性;意向性立场

 

 

 

 

0.1 问题的提出和研究现状

0.1.1 西方传统哲学对隐喻本质的解答

0.1.2 客观语义理论背景下对隐喻本质的解答

0.1.3 涉身认知语义论对隐喻本质的解答

0.2 本文探讨的问题范围和辩护的核心假设

0.2.1 本文探讨的问题范围

0.2.2 隐喻研究第一次转向中的问题说明

0.2.3 隐喻研究第二次转向中的问题说明

0.2.4 本文要辩护的核心假设

0.3 解释性现象分析的方法

0.4 本文的逻辑结构和章节安排

 

1 客观语义理论对隐喻本质的说明及内在困境

1.1 语义学扭转理论对隐喻的说明

1.1.1 对隐喻进行改述还原为直陈语句

1.1.2 自然语言意义的组合原则

1.2 实用主义隐喻理论对隐喻的说明

1.2.1 Searle关于隐喻性意义的存在性论证      

1.2.2 Searle对直陈理论的论证  

1.2.3 隐喻建构的八项基本原则和三个策略    

1.2.4 对八大基本原则的分析    

1.3 比较主义理论对隐喻的说明

1.3.1 Quintilian对隐喻本质的说明      

1.3.2 Fogelin所发展的现代比较主义

1.4 Davidson的强力取消理论对隐喻的说明

1.4.1 隐喻是语言的梦工厂

1.4.2 Davidson对隐喻“不可转述性”的说明  46

1.4.3 Davidson的正面论题 

1.4.4 Davidson的负面论题 

1.5 对比较主义与相似性原理的批评与责难

1.5.1 Searle对比较主义的批判

1.5.2 Black对比较主义的批判

1.6 “同质相似性”与“异质抽象相似性”概念的提出

1.6.1 Searle“负面存在性论断”的反驳

1.6.2 “同质相似性”与“异质抽象相似性”概念的提出

1.6.3 为比较主义辩护

1.7 小结

 

2 涉身语义论对隐喻本质的说明

2.1 L&J的“隐喻映射模型”

2.1.1 Reddy的“导管隐喻”概念

2.1.2 L&J的“隐喻映射模型”

2.2 认知科学哲学中涉身的涵义

2.3 L&J的涉身真理观与“单向涉身性”

2.3.1 L&J的涉身真理观

2.3.2 L&J的“单向涉身性”概念

2.4 F&T的“多空间认知模型”

2.4.1 F&T模型的说明及其核心概念

2.4.2 F&T理论的核心论题

2.5 两种认知模型的比照和实证研究结论 83

2.5.1 两种认知模型的解释力对比分析

2.5.2 解释性现象分析的实证说明     84

2.6 小结 86

3 第二代认知科学哲学视野下的隐喻研究  88

3.1 Vico的新科学 88

3.1.1 何为“新科学”  89

3.1.2 Vico的说明:一个知觉隐喻概念的产生  90

3.1.3 人类社会发展所依赖的隐喻式认知  91

3.2 隐喻的涉身性:隐喻式认知模型 93

3.2.1 一个知觉概念是如何产生的:一个新的模型  93

3.2.2 隐喻所依赖的涉身性特征  95

3.3 隐喻涉身性所涉及的“身体”概念    97

3.3.1 扁虫新长出的大脑     97

3.3.2 Merleau-Ponty的“身体图式”概念  99

3.4 涉身与隐喻意义的获取 102

3.5 符号接地问题 105

3.6 Glenberg的“索引假说”     107

3.7 小结 111

 

4 隐喻意义的生成机制    113

4.1 语词的初始概念化:知觉符号的产生 113

4.1.1 同质相似性原理  114

4.1.2 “雷”--造字解说      115

4.1.3 两个假想世界--知觉符号的涉身性(狭义)特征   116

4.2 行为模式导致的“共同指称”与镜像神经元的发现 118

4.3 涉身概念化过程    120

4.3.1 回顾实证调查的结果  121

4.3.2 跨文化间的概念化差异     122

4.4 意象图式与概念的抽象化    123

4.4.1 意象图式     124

4.4.2 概念的分异与抽象化  125

4.5 异质抽象相似性原理与L&J对相似性立场的否定    126

4.6 两种不同的“想象”概念    133

4.6.1 “想象”的一般涵义  133

4.6.2 两种不同的“想象”概念:想象think与想象see  136

4.7 小结 138

 

5 隐喻的交互认知如何可能    139

5.1 隐喻的修正功能    139

5.2 意向性概念与意向性立场    141

5.2.1 意向性概念  142

5.2.2 意向性立场  143

5.3 意向性立场在隐喻理解中的应用 145

5.3.1 作为基本策略的“意向性立场”     145

5.3.2 亚个体层面的相似性关联  145

5.4 认知的主体间性与镜像神经元的解读 147

5.4.1 对镜像神经元的解读  147

5.4.2 现象学对镜像神经元的解读-“共享的多重主体间性”概念       148

5.5 使用Darwin情感理论对镜像神经元的解读      150

5.6 隐喻涉身认知研究的应用    153

5.6.1 科学活动与隐喻式认知的关系  153

5.6.2 科学发现中隐喻的三种功能-Michael Bradie的辩护      156

5.6.3 作为科学词汇中基本元素的隐喻     156

5.7 小结 161

论文的主要结论    163

参考文献       166

附录(隐喻的实证调查)    178

     191

 

Abstract

On the traditional view of metaphor, it is considered as a matter of figures of speech in Poetics. Especially from the traditional view of Objective Truth Theory, metaphor has nothing to do with real truths. Philosophers would not take metaphor seriously for philosophical consideration. The first turn happened around 1940s, based on Empiricism, some philosophers started to analyze metaphors in the framework of Formal Semantics, which is mainly about truth conditions of metaphor. Under this view, metaphors are taken for granted as a linguistic phenomenon. 

There is a blooming field of research on rethinking of metaphors for philosophers, especially linguists. The issue of metaphors is mainly about meaning. Max Black (1954) proposes that there is a distinct meaning for a metaphor and develops Interactionism; Monroe Beardsley (1962) claims that there must be some metaphorical twist in meaning of words, and his explanation is considered as Semantic Twist Account; Donald Davidson(1978) strongly claims that there is no metaphorical truth, metaphors explain themselves; John Searle rejects the role of similarity and made a negative existential claim on Principle of Similarity; Robert Fogelin develops Quintilian's Context-sensitive Truth Conditions to defend for his comparison view of metaphor, and proposes an asymmetrical similarity to respond to Searle's argument on the role of similarity. In sum, between 1936 and 1988, philosophers mainly focus on how to construct the Truth Conditions of Metaphors in the framework of Formal Semantics.

The linguistic War between Chomsky and Lakoff touches the main problem of metaphor: the nature of metaphor. Some cognitive linguists, such as George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, deny that thinking is a matter of truth preserving inferential rules, thus mind-as-computer metaphor is wrong. Lakoff and Johnson claim that metaphor is about meaning with correspondence to our experience, instead of principle of similarity. They challenge the traditional study of metaphor with the followings: the embodiment of mind, the cognitive unconscious, metaphorical thought, correspondence to our experience instead of principle of similarity.

In this paper, I am on the side of Lakoff and Johnson and share the intuition that metaphor is central in the way we think and we understand about the world. However, there are some differences between their view and mine. In order to  give an adequate account of the nature of metaphor, it is necessary to propose some new hypothesis.

My assumptions in regard to the nature of metaphor are the followings:

                        I.            Ontological Thesis: Metaphor is not only symbolic, it is also conceptual.

                     II.            Principle of Heterogeneous Abstract Similarity: Metaphor is structured by means of correspondences according to Principle of Heterogeneous Abstract Similarity.

                   III.            Grounding Thesis: The grounding concepts for metaphorical concepts are perceptual symbols that clearly correspond to our direct experience "based on the brain states underlying the perception of referent", which are usually constructed according to Principle of Homogeneous Similarity.

                   IV.            Embodied Mechanism Thesis: Our conceptual system is grounded in our experience in the world, both the grounding concepts and metaphors. Metaphors are structured by our constant interaction with our physical and cultural environments, mental simulation, imagination think, emotion and other virtual perceptions.

                     V.            Thesis of Irreducibility of a metaphorical meaning: A metaphor has its irreducible meaning different from its literal meaning.

I will develop five chapters to defend for the above assumptions. In sum, if our understanding of abstract concepts depends on a metaphorical extension of our perceptual symbols and basic embodied experiences, then we should accept Lakoff and Johnson's hypothesis and make efforts to develop a framework in the perspective of second-generation of Cognitive Science. If my arguments of the above assumptions are solid, the framework I develop in this paper will be better in understanding the nature of metaphor, even the nature of our thought and consciousness, which I call this framework as "Embodied Semantic Account". This could establish a break from standard cognitive science.

Besides, in order to achieve a successful communication by metaphors between individuals, it is important to discuss Subjectivity in metaphorical understanding. I introduce Mirror Neurons for the discussion of how metaphors can be understood. In the phenomenological interpretation, embodied cognition of the mirror neuron system is questioned because of its incompatibility in Husserl's phenomenology. By adopting a Darwinian point of view of the "Mirror Neuron System", it is possible to break down the ontological barriers between the biological and mental world. Also, Mirror Neuron System can provide a subpersonal explanatory framework for intersubjectivity.

 

Key words: Metaphor; Cognition; Heterogenous Abstract Similarity; Embodiment; The Intentional Stance.

 

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