主讲：John R. Searle
Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley
家。他自1959年以来，任教于伯克利，曾获Jean Nicod Prize和国家人文科学
In Intentionality (1983), I argued that the content of perceptual experiences gives us direct presentations of their objects and that the intentionality of perception thus differs from certain other forms of intentionality, such as belief and desire, in that it is presentational and not representational. In that book, I did not go into much detail about the characteristics of presentational intentionality, but I believe that an understanding of it is essential to understanding perception. Representations are sometimes perceivable and typically manipulable. Perceptual presentations are never either. You can see photographs, paintings, movies, television programs, and all of those are representations, but you cannot see visual experiences. You cannot see visual images, another kind of representation, but you can manipulate them. You cannot in that way manipulate visual experiences. Failure to understand such points is responsible for a very large number of disasters over the past 350 years in philosophy, and I intend to discuss some of these in this article. The article is a fragment of a book I am writing about perception.