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2015-吴展昭:从波普尔反归纳主义到豪森贝叶斯主义
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题目:从波普尔反归纳主义到豪森贝叶斯主义——证伪理论演变的一个侧面

作者:吴展昭

指导老师:刘大椿

答辩时间:2015519

 

 

导言  

0.1 选题背景及其意义

0.1.1 选题背景  

0.1.2 选题意义  

0.1.3 研究问题的界定与研究方法

0.2  文献综述与论文结构

0.2.1 文献综述  

0.2.2 论文结构  

0.2.3 本文难点与重点

 

第一章   波普尔——反归纳主义与新的研究进路 

1.1 另辟蹊径——演绎法取代归纳法   11

1.1.1 波普尔对归纳法的批判  11

1.1.2 演绎法及其实用上的辩护   14

1.1.2.1 证伪主义方法论的逻辑根据   14

1.1.2.2 实用上的辩护 15

1.2 新方法论下的科学知识增长模式   16

1.2.1 科学知识的增长——相对的标准与绝对的标准   16

1.2.2 知识增长的相对标准——用演绎的证伪法取代归纳法    18

1.2.3 科学知识增长的绝对标准——追求真理或者逼真性  20

1.2.3.1 “真”的概念 20

1.2.3.2 逼真性   21

1.2.3.3 “真”与逼真性  22

1.3评波普尔对归纳问题的解决方案   23

1.3.1 波普尔消解归纳问题的目的及其认识论根源 23

1.3.1.1 处理归纳问题的目的  23

1.3.1.2 消解归纳问题的认识论根源   24

1.3.2 评波普尔消解归纳问题方案的困难  27

 

第二章 沃特金斯——波普尔证伪理论的深化

2.1 科学理论选择标准的深化  34

2.1.1 沃特金斯批判波普尔的科学理论选择标准   34

2.1.2 维护科学理论选择的合理性 35

2.1.3 科学目的的适宜性条件  36

2.1.4 最佳的科学目的 37

2.1.5最佳科学目的的阐明 38

2.2评沃特金斯对休谟归纳问题的回应 41

 

第三章 拉卡托斯——精致证伪主义与归纳法的回归

3.1 科学知识的增长问题  45

3.1.1 拉卡托斯批判波普尔的科学知识增长模式   46

3.1.2 拉卡托斯批判库恩的科学知识增长模式  51

3.1.3 拉卡托斯的科学知识增长模式   55

3.1.4 评价拉卡托斯的科学知识增长模式  56

3.2 科学理论的评价问题  59

3.2.1 拉卡托斯批判卡尔纳普的科学理论评价标准 59

3.2.1.1 批判卡尔纳普的确认理论 60

3.2.1.2 批判卡尔纳普的特定预测理论 63

3.2.1.3 批判合理赌商 65

3.2.1.4 关于确认函数的几个关键概念关系的辨析 66

3.2.2 拉卡托斯批判波普尔科学理论的评价学说   68

3.2.2.1 批判“可接受性1  68

3.2.2.2 批判“可接受性2  69

3.3评拉卡托斯的“可接受性3”——归纳法的回归    71

 

第四章 豪森——主观贝叶斯归纳主义与精致证伪理论的深化

4.1豪森贝叶斯概率归纳逻辑的理论内容   77

4.1.1 概率归纳逻辑的演变    77

4.1.2 贝叶斯定理的基本概念  86

4.1.3 贝叶斯确认逻辑 88

4.1.4大弃赌论证  89

4.1.5 豪森主观贝叶斯理论的哲学意蕴 90

4.2豪森对归纳问题的解决方案    93

4.2.1 豪森对波普尔归纳问题解决方案的批评  93

4.2.2豪森对归纳问题的回应  95

4.3评豪森主观贝叶斯归纳主义    97

4.3.1 豪森主观贝叶斯主义与证伪理论的演变  97

4.3.1.1豪森主观贝叶斯主义与精致证伪学说  97

4.3.1.2 豪森主观贝叶斯主义与判决性检验    99

4.3.2 豪森主观贝叶斯主义的理论困难 100

4.3.2.1 验前概率 100

4.3.2.2 证据问题 102

 

结论

参考文献

 

 

 

 

摘要

 

本文研究的是证伪理论的发展变化,选取了波普尔、沃特金斯、拉卡托斯与豪森四位具有学术声望与广泛影响力的哲学家的学说进行详细的考察。证伪理论包含的内容广泛,本文从一个角度切入,即围绕四位哲学家讨论归纳问题看证伪理论的演变,由此构成贯穿本文的主要线索。波普尔认为归纳法不具有逻辑合理性,用证伪法取代之;沃特金斯认为归纳法不具有逻辑合理性;坚持并深化波普尔的证伪法;拉卡托斯认为归纳法不具有逻辑合理性,但科学史告诉我们科学实践是一个证伪与证实并存的过程,遂不得不迎回归纳法;豪森认为归纳法具有逻辑合理性,主张主观贝叶斯主义。大致看来,可分为波普尔、沃特金斯的反归纳主义立场与拉卡托斯、豪森的归纳主义立场。以此为线索分别深入考察各位哲学家的思想后得出结论,证伪理论的演变是:从波普尔开创证伪理论开始,到沃特金斯对证伪理论的深化,再到拉卡托斯的精致的证伪主义,最后到贝叶斯检验模型对精致证伪主义的深化,即运用主观贝叶斯主义为证伪理论提供数理逻辑依据。

波普尔、沃特金斯与拉卡托斯关于科学哲学的思想被归为证伪主义的观点是得到了学界的普遍认同。然而,将豪森的主观贝叶斯归纳主义也归为证伪主义的观点必定会引来大量的质疑与批评。贝叶斯归纳逻辑是概率归纳逻辑的一种理论,与波普尔的证伪法是背道而驰的。豪森是当今国际上主观贝叶斯主义的领军人物,一再明确表示其坚定的归纳主义立场,从来没有自称为证伪主义者,也没有主动运用贝叶斯检验模型为证伪理论作任何辩护。而有趣的是,拉卡托斯的精致证伪主义思想与波普尔的判决性检验思想均可以在豪森的贝叶斯检验模型内得到圆满的解释。拉卡托斯的研究纲领之所以是精致的证伪主义是因为他融合了确证与否证,但却抛弃了波普尔提出的判决性检验的思想。这是与科学史不符的。科学史证明,在科学的活动实践中,判决性检验是大量存在的。笔者将尝试证明,豪森的贝叶斯检验模型不仅解释了拉卡托斯证实与证伪相结合的思想,同时合理地解释了波普尔的判决性检验。不仅如此,在贝叶斯检验模型的框架内,还可以衍推出波普尔判决性检验是拉卡托斯证实与证伪相结合思想的逻辑后承。前者是后者应有之义,包含于后者当中,是后者的特殊情况。由于豪森的贝叶斯纲领有机整合了朴素证伪主义与精致证伪主义的核心思想,并为其提供了数理逻辑的依据,因此可以将豪森的贝叶斯检验模型视为证伪理论的一个逻辑框架,是对证伪理论的进一步深化,纵然豪森从来未曾作出过类似的论证。

全文分为六部分,第一部分为导言,接下来对四位哲学家学说的讨论各为一章,最后一部分是结论。

导言介绍了本文选题的背景与意义、所使用的研究方法与文献综述等等。

第一章考查了波普尔对归纳问题的解答,详细介绍他在否定归纳法以后是如何提出假说演绎法即朴素的证伪主义学说;并将对归纳法合理性的讨论转化为对科学理论选择的探讨,开创了新的研究方向;最后从学理上分析其深层的认识论原因。

第二章考查沃特金斯将归纳问题视为实用问题后,一方面如何继承波普尔的思想并将其转化为选择的标准之一,另一方面如何利用两个假设解决归纳的实用问题;在关于科学理论的选择问题方面,他又是如何继续深化理论选择的标准以及如何进一步发展波普尔关于经验基础与验证方面的理论。

第三章论述分为两大部分。第一部分是拉卡托斯回应波普尔所提出的科学知识的增长问题,以及他是如何运用库恩的理论修正波普尔的学说,形成精致的证伪理论;第二部分论述拉卡托斯是如何重新迎回归纳法的。虽然归纳法不具有逻辑合理性,但在实际科学活动中证实又是不可或缺的,因而不得不以最弱的形式,即形而上学式地迎接归纳法的回归。对于科学理论的选择问题,如何糅合卡尔纳普与波普尔的学说从而得出“可接受性3”。

第四章详细介绍豪森的主观贝叶斯主义的学说,评价其对归纳问题的解决方案与尝试证明贝叶斯验证模型有机整合了朴素证伪主义学说与精致证伪主义学说的核心思想,最后探讨该研究进路的理论困难。

结论部分总结全文,尝试完整地勾勒出验证理论演变的历史过程。将验证理论放在归纳问题这个更大的背景中,探讨其理论得失,未来走向及其价值。

 

关键词:波普尔;证伪理论;沃特金斯;拉卡托斯;豪森贝叶斯主义

 


 

Abstract

 

This paper studies on the evolvement of the theory of falsification by focusing on four philosophies’ (Popper, Watkins, Lakatos and Howson) theories who are famous and broadly influential in academic. The theory of falsification contents a lot of aspects. What’s the way of the paper is researching the evolvement of the theory of falsification around those four philosophies’ discussion about induction reasoning, which is the clue through the whole paper. Popper thinks that Inductive reasoning doesn’t possess logical rationality, so that he replaces logical rationality by the theory of falsification. Watkins doesn’t think induction reasoning possesses logical rationality also, and sticks to and advances Popper’ theory of falsification. Lakatos has the same idea as the former two people on whether the induction reasoning possesses logical rationality of not, however, he deems that we have to accept induction reasoning again because scientific practice is a process adopted both two ways of falsification and induction according to the history of science. Howson accepts induction reasoning, he advocates Bayesianism. Roughly, i classify those four ideas into two: Popper and Watkins share the same idea of opposite induction reasoning, on the other side, Lakatos and howson both accept induction reasoning. I draw a conclusion by respective exploring each philosophy’s idea that the evolvement of the theory of falsification began with Popper’s establishment to Watkins’ advancement, next to Lakatos’s sophisticated theory of falsification, finally to the advancement of sophisticated theory of falsification by using the testing model of Bayesianism, that is to provide mathematical logic for the theory of falsification by using subjective Bayesianism.

PopperWatkins and Lakatos have winned widely approvement in academic. However, it would be questioned and criticized widely that thinking of objective Bayesianism of Howson as the theory of falsification. The inductive logic of Bayesianism is one kind of probabilistic inductive logic, which opposites to the Popper’s theory of falsification. Howson is the leader of the subjective Bayesianism in the world, and he claimed his standpoint of induction reasoning. He never claimed himself a falsificationist and never defended for the theory of falsification by using the testing model of Bayesianism. It is interesting that Lakatos’ sophisticated theory of falsification and Popper’s idea of crucial experiment can both be well interpreted in the frame of the testing model of Bayesianism. Lakatos’ research programe is sophisticated theory of falsification due to it merges confirmation and falsification together, but Lakatos discards Popper’s idea of crucial test, which isn’t in accordance with the history of science. The history of science manifests that there are a lot of crucial tests in scientific practices. The author will try to prove that Howson’s model not only interprets Lakatos’ idea of merging confirmation and falsification together, but interprets Popper’s crucial test in reason. The former is the nature of things of the latter, and is contained by the latter, and is a special situation of the latter. Given Howson’s Bayesian program incorporates Naive Falsificationism and sophisticated Falsificationism, and provides mathematical logical basis for sophisticated Falsificationism, so, it is capable that thinking of Howson’s test model as a logical frame of fasificatism, as nest advancement of falsificationsm, though Howson himself never demonstrated like so.  

The paper Is divided into six parts. The first part is introduction, the next section will respectively discuss four philosophies in order, the last section is the conclusion.

The introduction introduces the background and the value of the topic, the researching way and literature review, and so on.

Chapter one, study Popper’s answer to induction, introduce in detail how to put forward simple falsifications, and convert the discuss about the rationality of induction to how to select scientific theory, which created a new direction of study. The final part analyzes the deep epistemological reasons. 

Chapter two, study how Watkins succeed Popper’s idea and converted it to a standard of selection, on the other side, how he resolved Practical issue of induction though two hypothesis after he consider inductive question as practical issue. And, the chapter also discuss how Watkins continually deepen the standard of choosing theory and how he advanced Popper’s idea about empirical basis and testing theory about choosing scientific theory.   

Chapter three is divided into two parts. The first is that Lakatos respond the increasing question of scientific knowledges from Popper, and how Lakatos amends Popper’s theory by using Kuhn’s theory. Induction doesn’t possess logical rationality, but confirmation is needed in real scientific activities, so that induction’s return is necessary though weakest form——metaphysical form. Chapter 3 also talks about that how to merge Carnap’s theory and Popper’s theory together to gain acceptability to choose scientific theory.

Chapter 4 introduces in detail the ideas of Bayesianism, valuate the core idea of the solution for induction and the trying to prove Bayesianism integrate simple falsificationism and sophisticated falisificationism. At the end, theoretical difficulties of study approach is investigated.

The conclusion generalizes the whole paper, try to sketches completely the historic process of testing idea. And, the conclusion put testing idea under the background of induction, to discuss success and failure of the theory, the future direction and its value.

 

Key Word: Popper, Falsification Theory, Watkins, Lakatos, Howson’s Bayesianism

 

 

 

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