第一场

报告题目：Wittgenstein and the Dualism of the Inner and the Outer

报 告 人：唐浩  武汉大学哲学院副教授          

时    间：2013年10月11日（周五）下午2：30-3：30

地    点：中国人民大学人文楼五楼会议室

报告人简介：
唐浩，美国匹兹堡大学（University of Pittsburgh）哲学系博士，科学史与科学哲学系硕士，复旦大学材料科学系学士，现任武汉大学哲学院副教授。主要研究领域为维特根斯坦、语言哲学及心灵哲学。有论文发表于Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews。  

报告摘要：

A dualism characteristic of modern philosophy is the conception of the inner and the outer as two independently intelligible domains. Wittgenstein’s attack on this dualism contains deep insights. The main insight (excavated from §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations) is this: our sensory consciousness is deeply shaped by language and this shaping plays a fundamental role in the etiology of the dualism. I locate this role in the learning of a sensation-language (as described in §244), by showing that this learning is, under another aspect, the incision of language, namely the infliction of cuts upon certain natural-primitive unities between the inner and the outer. These cuts, driven by powerful forces, eventually harden into an entrenched division between the inner and the outer, thereby providing a constant soil for the dualism. That this dualism is rooted in the very learning of a language is cause for ambivalence about language.

第二场

报告题目：Extended Mind and Swampman

报 告 人：任会明  山东大学哲社学院哲学系“齐鲁青年学者”特聘教授          

时    间：2013年10月11日（周五）下午4：00-5：00

地    点：中国人民大学人文楼五楼会议室

报告人简介：

任会明，美国佛罗里达大学哲学博士、浙江大学人文学院哲学系，师资博士后，美国康奈迪格大学哲学硕士（2000年）、北京大学哲学硕士（1998年）、安徽师范大学理学学士（1993年）。曾担任浙江大学人文学院哲学系副教授，现任山东大学哲社学院哲学系，“齐鲁青年学者”特聘教授。主要研究领域为心灵哲学、知识论和语言哲学。有论文发表于Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel，Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, International Journal of Philosophical Studies。

报告摘要：

The reporter argues that external cognitive processes claimed by proponents of the extended mind thesis (EMT) must involve representations and these representations have only derived intentionality. They therefore cannot have the same functional role as representations with original intentionality, which are normally realized by a brain state.